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The regulation of gender in menopause theory  
Along with killer whales, pilot whales and captive chimpanzees, humans are one of 
only three species who undergo cessation of menses as some points in their lives 
(Morton et al 2013: 1). Other species, including wild chimpanzees, see their 
reproductive functions slow down and the animals die not long after they have 
ceased to reproduce. The reasons for the end of fertility but the continuation of life 
in the females of certain species are thus a puzzle of evolution that has remained 
unsolved. We can trace scholarly interest in the menopause as far back as the 
ancient Greeks. From the earliest account (Aristotle, 4th Century BC) to the most 
recent (Morton et al 2013), there have been many attempts at formulating a theory 
of menopause that would explain its existence and clarify its social significance. 
Authors who have offered theories of the menopause do so with different agendas. 
Some wish to find the reasons for its occurrence and seek to tie ‘menopause’ to 
woman’s condition (especially in medical accounts, starting with Gardanne in 1821); 
others object to the idea of menopause as a distinct gendered experience and see it 
as participation to patriarchal ideology (feminists like Ussher 2006); others still 
question the conception of ‘menopause’ experience, whether gender-specific or not 
(Foxcroft 2010).  
This article aims to revisit some established theoretical models that hoped to 
explain menopause in humans. Indeed, over the past two millennia, certain 
hypotheses have become important landmarks in the theorising of menopause. 
Amongst those, there is an overwhelming inclination for casting menopause as the 
outcome of evolution and/or as a medical condition. I will chronicle key theories of 
menopause, in medical accounts of the menopausal experience and in theories 
casting menopause as a marker of human evolution, and in each case, will highlight 
the relationship between menopause and regulation. This will offer an evaluation of 
how (some) narratives of menopause make regulation/deregulation epistemically 
significant. The theorising of menopause experience that I am proposing will thus 
show how menopause should be considered a key area of enquiry in future debates 
in gender and identity politics. 
 
1- THEORIES OF MENOPAUSE 
1.1- From early accounts to the Antiquities 
One of the earliest recorded references to menopause is that of the Old Testament. 
In God’s desire for a new Covenant, Abraham is chosen to become the father of 
new nations, the first patriarch. The new Covenant requires new descent. 
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Abraham’s wife Sarai is too old to bear children so God intervenes to circumvent 
Sarai’s menopause and change Abraham’s prospects (Genesis, XVII: 15-17).  
15. And God said unto Abraham, As for Sarai thy wife, thou shalt not call 
her name Sarai, but Sarah1 shall  her name be.  
16. And I will bless her, and give thee a son also of her: yea, I will bless her, 
and she shall be a mother of nations; kings of people shall be of her. 
17. Then Abraham fell upon his face, and laughed, and said in his heart, 
Shall a child be born unto him that is a hundred years old? and shall 
Sarah, that is ninety years old, bear?2 
This early account contains some of the key elements that menopause will come to 
represent: menopause as loss of fertility for woman, loss of woman’s fertility as loss 
of status for man; menopause reversal as terrain for enhanced status for man; the 
potential menopause reversal offers for social change; the need for third party 
intervention (here God) to bring this potential to fruition.  
 
Menopause theory starts in earnest in the Antiquities. Cessation of menses (with no 
evident distinction between amenorrhea and menopause) becomes an illness by 
which the individual is poisoned by too much blood (plethora) failing to leave the 
body.  
The Ancient Greeks’ position on women and menopause is linked to the pro-natalist 
gender biased beliefs of the time: women interest the (male) Ancient Greeks 
inasmuch as they are capable of producing sons. To this patriarchal society, the end 
of a woman’s fecundity is bad news and means the loss of possibility to expand 
patriarchal authority. For example, 4th Century BC medical understandings of 
women’s physiology positioned a healthy woman on the side of fecundity. Vice-
versa, medical explanations of women’s illnesses tended to be directed towards 
uterine problems (Gentile 2009: 45). Gentile summarising views from the 
Hippocratic corpus (4th Century BC) and the work of Aristotle (384BC-322BC) 
explains that for the Ancient Greeks, a healthy woman has spongy flesh which soaks 
up excess nourishment from her stomach (Gentile 2009: 52). This excess 
nourishment is converted into blood and stored as menstrual fluid in the flesh and 
vessels. For Aristotle, the difference between men and women’s treatment of 
excess is essentially founded on his views on temperature: men’s bodies are warm 
and dry (engage in hard work, have vitality, enjoy the outdoors, etc) and women’s 
                                                     
1 Sarah meaning ‘princess’, implying Abraham’s interest as ‘prince’. 
2 The Holy Bible, 1875 
3 
 
are cold and wet (stay indoors, are more quiet, etc). When experiencing excess 
nourishment, women, being colder, cannot discharge excess nourishment like men 
can when they engage in activities that involve sweating for example. This would 
explain why women have periods and men do not: in a healthy body, the discharge 
of menstrual blood is woman’s way to evacuate blood plethora. With ageing, 
women become less porous and spongy and so cannot absorb as much 
nourishment. The end of excess nourishment marks the end of women’s blood 
production and storage. Women become more like ageing men, colder, drier and 
denser (Gentile 2009: 54), which goes some way to explaining the increased social 
freedom that post-menopausal women experience in Ancient Greece. Treatments 
for blood plethora are plenty, consisting for example of means to encourage the 
body to evacuate the excess of blood: dieting, vapour baths, fumigations, pessaries, 
fomentation (Foxcroft 2010: 41) and even blood letting, regarded then as ‘the most 
effective treatment’ (Formanek 1990: 7). 
As in the biblical account of Sarah’s reversed menopause, we also find in the 
Antiquities that there is a relationship between menopause and social status. 
Women gain social status as a consequence of the defeminisation/masculinisation 
menopause affords them. Divine intervention ended an unhappy situation caused 
by menopause in the Biblical story (loss of fertility for Sarah, loss of status for 
Abraham). In the Ancient world, we have again the intervention of a third party, the 
physician, to redress an unhappy situation (blood plethora) and bring forth change 
for menopausal woman. It is interesting to note that menopause reversal benefits 
the woman’s husband while menopause benefits women themselves. It becomes a 
salient point when considering the commentator’s critical tone in the next section. 
 
In Old Age from Antiquity to Post-Modernity, Parkin (in Johnson, 2003) finds the 
same attitudes towards post-menopausal women in Roman times:  
‘after the menopause, a woman was apparently granted the freedom to 
go outside the family confines. As widows in particular, in both Greek 
and Roman society, women in old age might in fact enjoy considerable 
authority, in practice if not also in legal theory, because they controlled 
the family wealth to some limited extent’ (Parkin in Johnson, 2003: 37) 
Parkin however, frames older women’s post-menopausal experience in negative 
terms, judging that the increased freedom and authority they enjoyed was poor 
compensation for men’s disinterest in them. Older women effectively found 
themselves relegated to the margin of socio-political visibility, which included 
medical disinterest in the ageing woman’s needs. While I do not agree with Parkin’s 
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gloomy views on the reality of being an old woman in Greek and Roman times, his 
analysis is noteworthy because he explicitly associates women’s increased status 
with decreased gender markers.  
The tension between different perspectives permeates these early accounts. On the 
one hand, menopause is seen as woman’s relegation from social organisation, on 
the other she is liberated from them. Menopause experience is for a big part the 
experience of this tension which re-activates the perennial question of what woman 
is or ought to be. More to the point, menopause reactivates the difficulty in 
imagining womanhood as a happy experience when woman exceeds or steps out of 
pre-established social codes. This tension will grow stronger as more theories of 
menopause are proposed. 
 
1.2- Middle Ages 
Status gain is also very present in medieval accounts of menopause. In Attitudes 
Toward Post-Menopausal Women In the High and Late Middle Ages, 1100-1400, 
Godfrey (2011) remarks that ‘[o]nce they were no longer seen as sexual or 
procreative object, menopausal and post-menopausal women were freer to 
participate in society’ (61). Their authority was exercised in domestic settings, over 
their offspring, but also in more public matters such of choosing appropriate 
husbands for the daughters and even becoming the head of a household when their 
husbands died. The authority of such widows could be quite extensive, especially in 
affluent families: they ‘owned property, and participated in social, legal, and 
economic activities’ (62), took decisions about who their children could marry, 
some widows were even recorded as reverting to bearing their maiden names and 
their children, female and male, being known by that name also, rather than the 
dead father’s name.  
In contrast, Godfrey finds that ‘[d]idactic and prescriptive works and literature 
tended to display attitudes that were more negative, satiric, and pessimistic’ (63) 
compared with accounts of actual lived experience by menopausal women. We will 
return to the gender contingent epistemic bias that accompanies menopause 
accounts, but it is worth noting now that, unsurprisingly, gloomy narratives of 
menopause tended to be written by men, heavily influenced by Ancient Greek and 
Roman attitudes towards menopause, as opposed to more positive accounts, which 
were usually the work of menopausal women. The discrepancy between medieval 
(men’s) reports and the reality of medieval women’s lives after the menopause was 
compounded by the fact that less affluent women were not literate and did not 
share their experience via literary records. Hence, medieval narratives of 
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menopause tend to be third person narratives recorded by men and a few women, 
the most famous perhaps being Hildegard Von Bingen (1098-1179), a Benedictine 
mystic and herbalist who from 1141 started sharing her religious visions in an 
illustrated diary, the Scivias3. Her dedication to keeping literary records of her 
mystic experiences has left us numerous narratives, including chronicles of medieval 
women’s menopausal/post-menopausal lives. Her writings on menopause 
experience in the Middle Ages are one of the very few positive accounts of the time 
on that topic. In a climate where printed texts were few and mostly concerned 
themselves with religious matter, being a recognised and respected catholic nun 
gave Hildegard Von Bingen literary legitimacy. In addition to religious influence, her 
vast knowledge of plants also gave her narratives a medicinal if not medical edge. 
Beyond the limitations of her gender, the combination of religion and medicine 
allowed Hildegard’s work to find favour with the male literary establishment, in 
medieval times but also beyond.  
So, in medieval times again we find a discrepancy between two opposed 
interpretations of menopause experience: on the one hand, the maintenance of 
menopausal woman’s social insertion is framed as both her happiness and 
oppression, on the other, her social exclusion becomes the site of her doom and 
liberation.  
 
1.3- The Enlightenment 
‘Less than 300 years ago, it [the menopause] barely existed on the medical radar, let 
alone made appearances in classifications of diseases and other works on 
pathology’ (Foxcroft 2010: xi). The 17th and 18th Centuries are a truly pivotal 
moment in the history of menopause theory, the moment when menopause theory 
begins in earnest. First, with the rise of the Age of Enlightenment, science gains an 
understanding of the difference between amenorrhea and menopause, both 
typified by an absence of menstruation. The cessation of menses with older age is 
regarded as a sign of preservation and health, rather than a sign of disease. John 
Freind was the first medical scholar to publish a book on menstruation, first in Latin 
(1703) and then in English (1729). Quoting Freind, Formanek explains that ‘[a]fter 
the seventh septenary, the vessels of the uterus would be too strong for the 
momentum of the blood to break through them. Thus, nature has wisely ordered 
that the menses should decrease with increasing age.’ (1990: 8).  
So, in this first point, just like Ancient physicians imagined an increasing ‘fullness’ of 
the uterus, here again we find the image of the ageing uterus as the site of a 
                                                     
3 See Von Bingen (1990) 
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‘thickening’ or a ‘hardening’. The big difference is that uterine fullness is a sign of 
disease that needs medical intervention to empty it for the Ancient Greeks, 
whereas in Freind’s account the body suffices to itself and no outside intervention is 
needed to regulate the uterus and its content.  
Second, in the late 18th Century, the term 'menopause' (or ‘ménépausie’ to be 
accurate) was coined by Charles-Pierre-Louis de Gardanne, a French physician who 
published in 1821 a treaty on the menopause (448). In De la ménopause, ou de l'âge 
critique des femmes (‘menopause: women’s critical age’) Gardanne advocates the 
use of the term 'menopause', understood as the cessation of menstruation. 
Menopause becomes an explanation for important life cycle changes in women. 
Gardanne’s contribution is truly a critique of the term 'climacteric syndrome', a 
term used then and still in use today. Gardanne objected to the use of the term 
‘climacteric syndrome’ as an imprecise medical term referring to several non-
specific symptoms, linked to women’s mid-life experience. In The Climacteric in 
Perspective (Notelovitz 1986), Wilbush draws an interesting historical overview of 
those complaints that came to typify women’s accounts of climacteric experience. 
His study shows that through history, women’s health complaints during 
menopause changed. To establish a climacteric syndrome is complicated by the 
changing character of the symptoms. For example, Wilbush notes that in the 18th 
and 19th century ‘loss of beauty’ was a prime complaint amongst menopausal 
women (122) while late 19th and modern era women are more concerned about the 
loss of status and of ability (in particular ability to perform sexually, or ability to 
regulate themselves and their bodies). Hence, climacteric syndrome would appear 
more culturally contingent than Gardanne’s term, which would have the merit to 
offer some constancy and universality of experience by virtue of being more 
science-based. The strain between objective and subjective dimensions of 
menopause experience will become particularly salient as we move towards 
contemporary theories. 
 
1.4- Victorian times 
The late 19th Century marks the beginning of the menopause as medical condition 
proper (Ussher 2006: 128). The overarching Victorian belief about menopause 
experience is overall rather gloomy and will bear heavily on contemporary visions of 
climacteric experience. In Victorian times, menopause is characterised by the over-
excitement of woman’s reproductive body, leading to the over-excitement of her 
mind. For Victorian medicine, symptoms of the menopause range from hysteria to 
depression, via amoral behaviour such as lying, steeling or worse for the Victorians: 
giving up on one’s wifely and familial duties. Menopause is a condition that affects 
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women’s nervous system. The only cure is containment of the menopausal woman, 
necessary to protect families, and more widely society, from the dangers of her 
depraved and uncontrollable behaviour. While restraining menopausal women 
becomes an effective coping mechanism, it is not a cure for Victorian anxieties 
regarding the menopause. The theory of the aptly named ‘wandering womb’ goes a 
long way to describing Victorian fears of menopausal women; no longer tied by 
pregnancies, maternal responsibility and often free of marital duty, older women 
discovered a newfound independence that alarmed Victorian society. To curb any 
desire to wander out of domestic spaces, Victorian women were encouraged to deal 
with manifestations of ‘wandering womb’ by keeping to a strict code of modesty 
regarding private ailments, this to avoid bringing social shame and reprobation onto 
themselves. (Foxcroft 2010: 58-9).  
Victorian attitudes towards the menopause eloquently depict the anxieties and 
fears that the menopause evokes at the time. They are a culmination of centuries of 
theories that explain ‘woman’ via her reproductive functions. The prospect of a 
woman free of that function (and free of the definition by which she becomes 
socially viable) causes reactive solutions that in Victorian times find their ultimate 
repression. Where earlier societies simply ignored them or brushed them aside and 
allowed these women a strange identity half way between woman and man, the 
Victorians were more categorical and repressed any deviation from established 
narratives of womanhood. While we may find such repression reprehensible, it 
seems to me that Victorian attitudes were the reverse side of the same problematic 
we are facing today: instead of encouraging women to repress the manifestation of 
menopause (the desire to wander beyond prescribed narratives of womanhood), 
women are instead encouraged to prevent menopause as soon as it manifests itself 
and in doing so prevent imagined symptoms of what menopause would be like 
without medical intervention.  
 
1.5- 20th and 21st Centuries: medical and evolutionary narratives 
Two narratives dominate contemporary theories of menopause: medical narratives 
(including psychiatry) and evolutionary narratives. The two often overlap. To begin 
with contemporary medical accounts, the term menopause has been widely used 
since the publication of Gardanne’s work in 1821. Yet, the description of 
menopause as cessation of menses is not in itself as sufficient a definition as it 
appears. Today, the way to define women as having ‘gone through’ the menopause 
requires that a woman has ceased menstruating for a minimum of twelve 
consecutive months, at which point she can be declared ‘post-menopausal. So, 
menopause is an experience that is retro-actively validated, rather than a true 
8 
 
experience in the here-and-now. Hence, a phenomenological understanding of 
menopause experience seems compromised by the fact that the experience is 
about what one believes may be happening, with belief standing instead of real 
experience. This has important consequences in understanding the role that 
regulation plays in menopause. For how can we have a pre-discursive experience of 
menopause when the very definition of menopause is founded on the retro-active 
recognition of experience? 
In principle there are scientific means to verify the stage a woman is at during peri-
menopause, by testing the levels of her follicle stimulating hormone (FSH). In 
practice, because hormone levels increasingly fluctuate during peri-menopause, this 
test alone cannot guarantee that the absence of menses is symptomatic of the 
menopause rather than a sign that she is experiencing something else that also has 
the cessation of menses as criterion (for example amenorrhea). Hence, cessation of 
menses alone is not sufficient to establish a definition of menopause. Other criteria 
need to be associated to it. This is where menopause becomes a rather subjective 
terrain of investigation. 
The main criterion is undoubtedly the difficulty to regulate physiological functions 
(Panay et al 2013): the body appears to fail to maintain a state of homeostasis and 
is experienced as fluctuating. For example, the individual may experience her 
physiological body as failing to regulate temperature (hot and cold flushes, night 
sweats); mood (mood swings, irritability, depression, anxiety, insomnia); she may 
report a fluctuation in cognitive ability (memory, concentration); and finally she 
may experience a changeability of her corporeal experience (inflammation of joints, 
headaches, wandering pains, vaginal dryness, pelvic floor weakness, heart 
palpitations, etc) (Formanek, 1990: 80). The more of these symptoms a woman says 
she suffers with, the more she is believed to be experiencing menopause. However, 
many if not all of these symptoms are also associated with other medical condition, 
making menopause-like complaints difficult to diagnose as menopause with any 
degree of certainty.  
The 20th Century is also marked by the expansion of psychiatry and the attempt to 
lay down a psychopathology of experience. With the birth of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) menopause makes its entrance as 
psychiatric disorder and the DSM becomes the closest thing to formalising the 
subjective dimension of menopause experience. For example, DSM I (published in 
1952) and DSM II (1968) have ‘Involutional Melancholia’ as a key aspect of 
menopause (Ussher 2006: 130). Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926), a psychiatrist generally 
recognised as the founder of modern psychiatry, used the term ‘involutional 
melancholia’ to refer to a feeling of fear, agitation and despondency that typically 
affected older individuals who had not previously been disposed to melancholia 
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(Shorter, 2005: 82). Depression and menopause would thus be a characteristic of 
women’s ageing bodies. The relationship between menopause and depression 
pertains until 1990 and the publication of DSM III (Stoudemire 1993: 272) when 
‘Involutional Melancholia’ disappears from DSM. However, the association between 
menopause and depression remains, evident in more popular beliefs like that of the 
existence of a mid-life crisis or the recent theory of the ‘Empty Nest Syndrome’ 
(Foxcroft 2010: 24; as its names indicates, a feeling of emptiness is caused when, 
the children having left home, a woman loses what once typified her existence, her 
status as ‘mother’). 
While psychiatric answers did not succeed in formalising a pathology of menopause, 
medicine had a breakthrough with another line of research, that of hormone 
replacement therapy (HRT) in the late 1920s, early 1930s. HRT becomes a viable 
medical and commercial venture from the mid 1900s (Blakemore et al 2001; note 
the collaboration between medicine and commerce). The 2013 figures compounded 
by Symphony Health solutions4 (market analysts) for the American market speak for 
themselves: the US market represented $3.7 billion in 2013 with 6 million American 
users. While the number of users has fallen sharply since the publication of The 
Women's Health Initiative (2004) showing a connection between HRT and cancer on 
the one hand, and HRT and cardiovascular disease on the other, a combination of 
factors such as the sharp increase in the cost of HRT and research guaranteeing a 
safer product allow for a happy forecast 2021 of about 8 million users for a profit of 
4.5 billion dollars. The medical promotion and social success of HRT rests on its 
promise to women to ‘live younger longer’. As mentioned earlier, it may simply be 
the continuation of a vision associating menopause with unspeakable social 
suffering if women do not agree to keep menopause and/or its manifestation at 
bay. But more cynically, it is also undoubtedly about the benefits HRT offers for the 
market and for medical empowerment. If we turn to another dominant voice of the 
20th/21st Centuries, the tendency to see menopause as affliction, and the 
advantages of doing so become even more pronounced. 
 
At the same time as contemporary medicine was finding scientific answers to the 
origin of menopause, in the wake of Darwin’s 1859 On the origin of Species, 
evolutionary theorists took a novel approach to explaining menopause. The turn of 
the 20th Century, is marked by the fast growing number of hypotheses following an 
evolutionary line of enquiry. The quick overview of the most common hypotheses 
presented below will show the richness and complexity that such theories brought 
to the field of menopause study. 
                                                     
4 See Zuckerman et al. (2013) 
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First we find a group of hypotheses that can be gathered under the banner of 
‘ageing’: menopause would simply be part of the ageing process. Between 1800 and 
2000, women’s average life span has increased from 30 years to sixty-seven (Riley 
2001: 1). Menopause should thus be hypothesised in relation to physiological 
senescence. Menopause would be a phenomenon directly associated with 
increased longevity (Caspari 2004: 10895) and its social significance would have 
arisen only in the past 200 years, when menopause makes an entrance as a new 
human experience. Based on what we have seen earlier, the theory of senescence is 
problematic, but not totally meaningless. First, menopause is not a phenomenon 
that suddenly appeared in the past 200 years. Accounts of women experiencing the 
cessation of menses, and that we now describe as menopause, have been 
documented at least since the Antiquities, if not earlier. It is possible that these 
accounts were discounted partly on the ground of medical or gender bias, partly 
because the number of women reaching menopause was negligible enough before 
the 20th Century for the experience to pass reasonably unnoticed. ‘In 1800, people 
aged sixty-five and higher made up less than 5 percent of most populations; by 
2000 their share had tripled to 15 percent in high life expectancy societies’ (Riley, 
2001: 2). If women constituted roughly half of that population, 2.5 percent women 
stopping menstruation could have passed unnoticed indeed. The increase in the 
number of women aged over fifty and scientific advances in human physiology 
resulted in a parallel increase in the interest woman physiology was afforded. The 
Follicular Depletion Hypothesis for example, whereby women have a fixed number 
of eggs at birth and run out of them at some point, causing the body to stop 
menstruating, is one such theory that benefitted from progress in medical 
understandings of reproduction. This theoretical model has only become partly 
redundant and is replaced today with another suggesting that, while a woman is 
born with more eggs than she will use during her life time, as age increases, these 
eggs begin to malfunction, causing infertility in women (Keefe et al 2006). So, in this 
first set of examples (increased longevity, Follicular Depletion and Follicular 
Malfunction), there is still today a trend in understanding menopause simply as an 
effect of senescence, and senescence as a by-product of medical advances. 
Interestingly, such theories still do not explain why the deterioration of the body 
with age would be species selective and affect only a very small minority of female 
mammals.  
Second, we find another set of theories that focus on a more social dimension of 
evolution. Here, menopause theories set up nature as interested party and as 
terrain of conflict between society interest and woman interest. On the one hand, 
society would gain at having women go through menopause; in the Mother 
Hypothesis, ageing mothers no longer able to reproduce would devote their energy 
to caring for children already born rather than to producing more offspring. Hence, 
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nature would favour a less is more situation where the birth of fewer children with 
a higher survival rate would be better than more children with a higher mortality 
risk. Similarly, the Grandmother Hypothesis sacrifices the reproductive functions of 
woman in favour of care for offspring. This theory should be taken in tandem with 
the Absent Father Hypothesis, whereby the increasing absence of fathers from 
family units is partly blamed for nature’s recall of grandmothers to ensure descent. I 
would also place a fourth hypothesis in the continuation of the three above. One of 
the most recent theories is that of Mate Choice Theory (Morton et al. 2013), 
whereby ageing male partners are choosing younger females as sexual partners, 
driving older women to menopause. From these four different hypotheses, we form 
a picture of social organisation puzzling over the problem of ageing. For what is 
society to do with its ageing, barren females in a climate that privileges 
reproduction as the epistemic signifier of ‘woman’? 
All the hypotheses presented above converge and agree on several factors: 1) the 
determination to position menopause within an ageing framework; 2) the 
introduction of man in the equation; 3) how these factors become determinant in 
the regulation of menopause. Contemporary theories thus propose to re-organise 
women according to their age and redefine the division of tasks according to this 
age hierarchy, from the youngest at the service of pregnancy and birth to the oldest 
at the service of upbringing. This is nothing more than a return to a definition of 
woman along the lines of biological destiny. There is however an amplification of 
what ‘woman’ is, capturing older women who by menopausal definition fall out of 
the earlier definition. I see in these hypotheses (Mother, Grandmother, Absent 
Father and Mate Choice) the strong drive to re-insert older women in the social 
contract, via theories that also re-assert reproduction as the linchpin of gender 
difference. In the context of an ageing population, the issue of the disconnection 
ageing/sexualisation has become relevant. It would be particularly interesting to 
ponder further on the consequences of HRT use, when HRT encourages the 
prevention/reversal of established rules of menopause. The re-sexualisation of 
women beyond menopause age necessarily changes the way social organisation is 








The narratives listed above are the major theories of menopause today. They can be 
categorised as either pertaining to a medical narrative explaining the ‘what’ of 
menopause, or as evolutionary account, explaining the ‘why’ of menopause. 
Neither says much about regulation (or lack thereof) as that which participates in 
the signification of experience. As we have seen, medicine does cast menopause as 
a set of symptoms where body functions fluctuate more than usual, but only as a 
means to assert stability as the healthy state. Hence, outside the medicalisation of 
menopause (Hormone Replacement Therapy, anti-depressants, etc), the medical 
profession has little to offer menopause theory. As for evolutionary theories of 
menopause, each one is in some form or other a replica of familiar narratives 
keeping women firmly on the side of their biological destiny. Moreover, at the point 
where women, by virtue of having become barren, could hope for the invention of a 
different social legitimacy, newer evolutionary theories emerge, asserting that the 
social use of menopausal women lies in serving reproduction further.  
Understanding the issue of reproduction is key to understanding why establishing a 
definitive theory of menopause is so difficult. Much has been done in philosophy of 
science and medicine to better define what constitutes health/illness. These 
debates are useful for a philosophical enquiry into menopause because they 
inevitably come upon the question of illness and ageing. Take for example the work 
of Boorse (1977) and Clouser et al (1981). Clouser, Culver and Gert  define malady 
as ‘a condition that involves the suffering or the increased risk of suffering an evil’ 
(31), an evil being ‘the genus of which death, pain and disability are species’ (31). If 
we apply their theory of illness to the context of menopause, menopausal 
complaints would be such disability in the sense that the individual is lacking ‘ability 
that is characteristic of the species’ (34), that is the ability to reproduce. For the 
authors, there is a turning point in human development after which one’s ills can be 
regarded as ‘malady’: ‘once one has reached the state of maturity there is no 
further relativizing of the concept of disabilitites. It does not matter if 100 percent 
of living ninety-nine-year-old persons lack the ability to run; their lack of ability is 
still a disability.’ (34). Their conclusions echo what we have described earlier: by the 
same logic, 100 percent of menopaused women lacking the ability to reproduce (a 
characteristic of the species once maturity has been reached) would categorise 
them as disabled, and therefore in need of remedial help.  
If we turn to the second enquiry, Boorse (1977) strongly refutes the use of 
adulthood as a cut-off point. In his own words:  
‘medical authors list progressive dysfunctions of normal aging as diseases. 
When senile decline of function is cause from within, our account will not 
allow it to be a disease. That is because of the age-relativity which we built 
into the account to reflect differences between child and adult. Apart from 
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childhood, one might be tempted to take the adult as the species type and old 
age as its disintegration. Yet the same functional limitations viewed as 
diseases in old age may count as normal in childhood. Much of senility is only 
regression to earlier stages of development. The puzzle is why old age is not 
always seen as a stage with its own statistical norms of healthy functioning.’ 
(Boorse, 1977: 567) 
In other words, Boorse calls for (at least) one other cut-off point to establish old age 
as a state in its own right, alongside childhood and adulthood. Yet, this is not 
possible because the ability to reproduce is used as the sole defining factor around 
which meaningful human experience is articulated.  Boorse concludes that a lack of 
resolution of this puzzle means that he would not categorise ageing ailments as 
disease. To apply his findings to our context, menopause defined as the cessation of 
reproductive functions would group older women and pre-pubescent girls together. 
The latter’s lack of reproductive ability is categorised as normal (as they are 
developing towards becoming sexually productive) while  the former are relegated 
to barren status and in need of recasting, medically and/or sociologically. Boorse 
would then argue that menopausal ‘symptoms’ (including barren status) is part of 
the healthy functioning of a separate stage of life, with statistical norms specific to 
itself, norms that are yet to be established.  
The disagreement apparent in Clouser, Culver and Gert’s work on the one hand, and 
Boorse’s on the other conveys the importance that social and discursive 
normalisation plays and places regulation at the heart of a progressive 
understanding of menopause. Theories of menopause, especially medical theories 
use reproduction as the regulatory force in their understanding of what constitute 
‘woman’. We could see in such conceptual frameworks the manifestation of the 
perennial question of patriarchal oppression against women. More practically, the 
lack of other viable norms of functioning (to use Boorse’s expression) means that 
medical responses to menopause concerns can only be focused on somehow re-
instating menopausal women inside the reproductive contract. The negativity 
associated with menopause (we saw this earlier with Parkin) prevents more positive 
norms of functioning (for example ‘independence’) from finding social favour. 
‘Independence’ is not a viable norm of menopause experience because such 
independence (that is: being free of the drive to reproduce; prompting men’s 
interest that is not sexual; etc) can only be marginal at best, if not meaningless, in a 
normative context founded upon sexual life. Any contentment experienced by 
menopaused women outside the social parameters by which happiness comes to 
mean is indeed non-sensical or in the margin of representation. Moreover, possible 
norms of menopause (independence, disinterest in sex/reproduction) tend to be 
associated with other negative states, for example a decreased sexual drive is a 
symptom often associated with depression (see our earlier point about psychiatry’s 
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interpretation of menopause). Hence, beyond medical and evolutionary reinsertion 
of woman, a theory of menopause that would chronicle woman’s experience 
outside her service to reproduction-focused societies offers the promise of novel 
epistemic understandings of gender at the threshold of women and men’s 
experience. For reasons of space, I am not proposing to show what these epistemic 
accounts might look like, but I will point towards theories that challenge the limit of 
experience, and recommend the application of those theories to menopause 
experience. 
 
If conceptual frameworks cannot accommodate menopause experience outside the 
frame of reproductive experience, it does not mean that menopause (and the 
women who experience it) is destined to remain outside the remit of intelligible 
experience. Indeed, it seems to me that menopause has become this experience 
that carries the same promise of political subversion as other, once marginal 
experiences described by authors like Julia Kristeva (see primary homosexuality5, 
écriture, jouissance for example) or Luce Irigaray (parler femme) or Judith Butler 
(queer experience). It is not by chance that these authors’ work revolves around 
human reproduction: Kristeva believes that outside sexual difference, no gendered 
experience can be iterated; Irigaray and Butler on the contrary denounce the role 
reproduction plays in the regulation of gender formations and propose that 
gendered experience can be other than  ‘phallogocentric’ (Irigaray), while Butler’s 
work shows how new gender formations would need to epistemically challenge the 
‘heteronormative matrix’. In what follows, I will be interested not solely in 
reproduction but more widely in the idea of regulation, as this has important 
implications for a gender focused philosophy of menopause. Indeed, a re-reading of 
‘regulation’ and of the failure to regulate holds the key to unpacking the epistemic 
conundrum that menopause experience represents. We will first address the 
question of epistemic understandings of the gendered experience, with the work of 
Irigaray. This will lead us in a second stage to looking more closely at the reasons 
behind the construction of menopause in relation to de/regulation, via the work of 
Butler. We will then be able to unpack further the mechanics of menopause as 
regulation and draw conclusions. 
 
The negativity that permeates menopause theories can be explained in two ways: 
partly it is a consequence of the heterosexual bias used as a gauge to measure one’s 
sexual/gender satisfaction, and partly it is the outcome of associations made 
between menopausal incidents and distaste. In the former case, authors like 
                                                     
5 See Gambaudo, 2012 
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Foxcroft or Irigaray (1985) show how ‘[w]omen’s sexual activity has traditionally 
been understood and measured by the frequency of penetrative intercourse and 
sexual satisfaction, and it assumes a pretty one-dimensional definition, constructed 
by a male-dominated culture’ (Foxcroft 2010: 16). In the second case, Ussher’s 
study of the reproductive body (2006) or Butler’s philosophy of sex/gender (1993, 
2004) present menopause experience as distasteful and thus forbidden. ‘In Western 
society, the ageing reproductive body is the epitome of the abject -with none of the 
redeeming features of youth or maternal femininity to save it from complete 
exclusion from the symbolic sphere’ (Ussher 2006: 126). The presentation of 
menopausal women is explicitly connected with a departure from one’s femininity 
and the gaining of masculine traits. In other words, menopausal women are 
situated in an in-between of experience, intersexed and transgendered (Butler 
2004: 43; 1993: 238), not dissimilar to other experiences where one has lost one’s 
proper gender (for example effeminate men or tom boys). I am thinking for example 
of the film Ma vie en rose, where a seven year old transsexual boy finds comfort and 
understanding when he moves in with his grandmother. ‘Granny’ is a middle-aged 
woman in the grips of menopause and trying to come to terms with the loss of 
proper womanhood that ageing provokes in her. The two characters connect in the 
place where their gender identities are now questioned by social conventions. More 
positively they find what they covet in the discourse they invent and where their 
improper feminisation is possible beyond those conventions (the imaginary, story-
telling and dancing for example). Much philosophy of menopause rests on 
understanding the manner the ‘proper’ of womanhood becomes an ontological 
signifier in the construction of gender.  
 
Irigaray (1985) has very successfully described the epistemic difficulty of accounting 
for gendered experience. She ventured that Western thought is not successful at 
conveying a sense of multiplicity of experience. Instead, conventional narratives 
only report on one type of experience that is the experience of man. Not only do 
man-centred cultures privilege only one dimension of experience but they are also 
incapable of accounting for those other, strange experiences when they are not 
mediated by man’s experience; for example the experience of ‘lesbianism’ is 
unintelligible unless it is framed by contrast to heterosexuality6. Irigaray critiques 
traditional epistemic frameworks (Freudian especially) and shows that woman’s 
experience makes sense inasmuch as it serves as catalyst of man’s experience. With 
the term ‘phallogocentrism’, Irigaray critiqued two aspects of narrative practices 
that pretend to tell us about human experience. First, ‘logocentrism’ rises out of the 
assumption that there truly is a ‘transcendental subject of knowledge [who] 
coordinates and controls the multiplicity of sensations and impressions received 
                                                     
6 See my ‘Julia Kristeva, ‘woman’s primary homosexuality’ and homophobia’ 
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from sense experience, thus forming a unified field of experience’ (Schutte 1991: 
65). Second, ‘phallocentrism’ is the pre-determined assumption that this 
transcendental subject of knowledge is a man and that man’s experience underpins 
all possible experiences. The combination of both, ‘phallogocentrism’ then, means 
that experiences are intelligible only on the condition that they are mediated by a 
certain epistemic practice that can answer two related questions: one, how does 
this experience fit into the puzzle of man’s sensitive experience? Two, are the terms 
by which this experience is described recognisable to its auditors?  
 
The issue of ‘recognition’ was further developed by Judith Butler (2004). Although 
she does not, like Irigaray, polarise gender into two categories, her suggestion of 
‘performative iteration’, the declarative doing of experience, complements 
phallogocentrism very well. If, for Irigaray, narratives of experience must follow a 
phallogocentric model, for Butler, they must also be perceived as having followed 
that model. Butler’s suggestion of a performative iteration of being is about being 
seen to participate in the elucidation of man’s sensitive experience. The perception 
of a doing of gender need not be an intentional act, not even a conscious one. 
Indeed, if we follow the work of materialist feminists (Christine Delphy or Monique 
Wittig come to mind), the institutional naturalisation of the doing of gender is even 
more powerful that it passes itself as natural (Delphy 1993: 1). For Butler, the 
mechanics of this naturalisation lies in how successful one is at repeating the same 
narratives over and over again: the better repeated the iteration, the more proper 
the identity. To sum up, successful gender identity needs two things: its narrative 
needs to resemble previous narratives of gender and the narration must pass as 
natural.  
 
Irigaray and Butler’s work contribute largely to building the epistemic journey a 
woman would need to travel to build a viable picture of menopause experience, 
outside phallogocentric construction. First, from an Irigarayan perspective, 
menopause would be that experience that essentially signifies ‘woman’. I am 
leaving aside theories asking the recognition of ‘andropause’, the menopause for 
men, to simplify matters. It is worth noting that andropause is framed in terms 
similar to those used for menopause: physiological senescence, infertility, with its 
own HRT remedies (Viagra for instance) aiming to reverse sexual dysfunction and 
prevent unpalatable symptoms. In theory menopause should be that narrative that 
participates in a phenomenology of woman’s experience and of woman only. In 
practice, phallogocentric recuperation means that menopause has become an area 
of study that re-enforces established narratives of gender. As we saw earlier, 
theories of menopause understand menopause experience in relation to the 
purpose woman serves in man’s experience, for example: childcare, domesticity, 
disease. To challenge phallus-centred theories of menopause, one would need to 
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theorise menopaused women’s sensitive bodies, before or aside of mediation by 
men’s perception of it. The observations made of menopausal ‘symptoms’ gain 
negative contingency by virtue of using a gauge that does not belong to the female 
body: decreased libido suggests a standard for libidinal activity that she fails to 
achieve, vaginal dryness points to penetrative intercourse that she struggles to 
facilitate, difficulties regulating moods implies evenness of mood as norm, etc. In 
short, menopause symptoms signify her non participation to a phallic economy. Yet, 
it does not suffice to ask that we begin to record what menopausal women say of 
their experience. Indeed, they themselves fall back on a phallic framework because 
gauging the distance between their experience and this framework has become the 
terms by which menopause is articulated as human experience. Narratives 
describing how she departs from normative gendered experience (for example 
complaining about mood swings or vaginal dryness to her physician) is now the 
means by which she can reclaim her place in phallogocentric narratives, first by 
reasserting that she once was a proper woman (‘I did not always have mood 
swings’), and a second time by voicing dissent against what she has become that is, 
revolting against one’s own improper being (signing up for a course of HRT for 
example). In the latter case, it is the role of the medical profession to receive this 
expression of dissent and actively participate in woman’s battle for social re-
insertion. Hence, a woman’s menopause narrative needs to resemble narratives of 
menopause previously established if her experience is to be recognised and 
validated. Deviation from this rule discounts experience as unrecognisable. 
So, how do we challenge those phallogocentric narratives of menopause 
experience? Menopause is by most medical and evolutionary accounts this area of 
experience that has become anomalous and no longer conforms to social 
recognition of woman. Butler suggested that media representations of menopausal 
women tend to mark them as subjects with ‘unlivable lives’, or occupying zones of 
social life that she sees as ‘uninhabitable’ (Butler 1993: 3). But these uninhabitable 
zones of social experience are in fact quite densely populated by those who, by 
choice or fate have dis-identified themselves from the privilege status of ‘social 
subject’. They are the ‘queer identities’ of Butlerian theory. Menopaused women 
would be prime candidates for such dis-identifications. If Butler is right in seeing 
such zones as the forefront of political engagement, then menopause must be one 
of the vanguard experiences of identity politics. We might wonder then what form 
that engagement can take. If hegemonic accounts of menopause experience 
(medical, evolutionary) are the pre-established narratives of menopause that 
women use to assert their allegiance to their social environment, it is thus also the 
place where they can be des-established. Butler proposed that ‘the task is not 
whether to repeat, but how to repeat… to displace the very gender norms that 
enable the repetition itself’ (Butler 1990 148). The incorrect repetition of 
menopause narratives, that is repeating models of signification pre-established as 
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signifying ‘ageing woman’, is then the condition of her agency towards a different 
epistemic account of menopause experience. Incorrect repetition might be the 
presentation of older women as sexually motivated in their social exchanges or on 
the contrary presenting sexual de-motivation as desirable.  ‘That the subject is that 
which must be constituted again and again implies that it is open to formations that 
are not fully constrained in advance’ (Butler 1995, 135). While one can never step 
outside of phallogocentrism and offer narratives constructed from an entirely 
different base, Butler’s work suggests that from within phallogocentric accounts, 
one can suggest more subversive narratives of menopause. I venture that stories of 
old age are and will be one of the places where we will (and already do) find them. 
For example narratives that portray the lived experience of older women’s 
sexuality, especially those depicting older women sexually attractive to and 
attracted by younger men and women, offer challenges to established narratives of 
menopausal women. I am thinking of fairly recent films like Something Gotta Give 
(2003), Ladies in Lavender (2004), Ma mere (2004), Notes on a Scandal (2006), or 
Savage Grace (2007), which peep into controversial worlds of erotic possibilities 
between the young and the old, possibilities ultimately sanctioned by a punishing 
message embedded in the story line: in each of these films, the young-man/woman-
meets-old-woman narrative is clandestine, and eventually miserable when it is not 
psychotic or deadly. More subtly and possibly more interesting aesthetically and 
politically, Ma vie en rose suggests a world where alliances between different queer 
experiences might make visible narratives so far marked as marginal experience 
(menopause and transexualism for instance). Hence, away from hegemonic 
accounts of menopause, current formations of menopause experience evoke fears 
of paedophilia and incest, the collapse of pre-determined social values, and the 
authorised incarnation of troubling identities. In this, it is reminiscent of other 
narratives, the emergence of which was also shrouded in fears and sanctioned by 
promises of doom of the regulatory forces of the time (sexual liberation, 
contraception, homosexuality, etc). While those once doomed narratives have by 
no means become authority, they have found some form of legitimacy.  
 
My conclusion on menopause would be that tidying menopause into a coherent set 
of experiences serves to insert menopausal woman’s identity in phallogocentric 
organisation. To agree to the reversal or to the prevention of menopause acts as a 
socialising gesture by which woman is invited to re-assert her position within that 
organisation and validate its principles. What could be called the ritualisation of 
menopause experience is supported nearly exclusively by medicine. Yet, while 
medical and evolutionary theories of menopause aim to re-insert woman in 
phallogocentric visions of her sex, other approaches can and do challenge such 
vision of menopause. First, a philosophical approach to menopause narratives 
(Irigaray, Butler) shows that the experience can be epistemically located at the 
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threshold of human experience. Second, the proliferation of aesthetic narratives of 
ageing are putting the imaginary experience of ageing and of menopause on the 
map of social reality. My aim in this paper was to magnify this reality and place 
menopause experience on the radar of academic interest. While there has been 
numerous studies on menopause, I have proposed that these have tended, by and 
large, to discuss menopause along the lines of existing definitions of gender. As I 
hope to have shown, the study of menopause can and should be much more than 
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